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Brass (Dequincy) v. State, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 23 (Apr. 07, 2022)1
CRIMINAL LAW: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND MOTIONS TO SUBSTITUTE
RETAINED COUNSEL
SUMMARY
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether a district court’s denial of a defendant’s
motion to substitute retained counsel violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. In evaluating a motion to substitute retained counsel, courts must consider
whether (1) granting the motion would significantly prejudice the defendant, or (2) the motion was
untimely and would result in an unreasonable disruption of the orderly processes of justice.
In this matter, the Court found that the district court abused its discretion and made a
structural error when it denied the defendant’s motion to substitute retained counsel. The Court
therefore reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial. In its reasoning, the Court concluded (1) that the defendant’s motion was timely under the
circumstances because the defendant filed the motion shortly after learning the full extent of his
retained counsel’s inadequate preparation, and (2) the defendant’s right to retained counsel
outweighed the potentially disruptive effects of a further trial continuance.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2017, the State of Nevada (“the State”) charged appellant DeQuincy Brass
(“Brass”) with five counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen; ten counts of sexual
assault of a minor under the age of fourteen; one count of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment;
three counts of first-degree kidnapping of a minor; two counts of preventing or dissuading a
witness or victim from reporting a crime or commencing prosecution; and one count of battery
with the intent to commit sexual assault of a victim under the age of sixteen. These charges
stemmed from Brass’ alleged conduct with his partner’s children between May 2015 and February
2017.
After determining that Brass was indigent, the justice court appointed an attorney from the
Clark County Public Defender’s office to represent him. However, in the interim, Brass’ family
retained Mitchell Posin (“Posin”), and the justice court substituted Posin as Brass’ counsel in
January 2018. On February 14, 2018, Brass pleaded not guilty, and the district court set the initial
trial for April 30, 2018. Brass requested two continuances at subsequent status checks, citing a
need for more preparation time. The court granted both continuances and rescheduled the trial for
November 13, 2018. At the November 8, 2018, calendar call, the State announced it was ready for
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trial, but Brass requested a third continuance. At this point, Posin stated he did not feel he would
be able to provide Brass adequate assistance of counsel because the State had recently made
available new discovery that Posin had not had a chance to thoroughly review. The district court
rescheduled the trial for May 13, 2019.
At a May 7, 2019, calendar call, Posin requested to continue the calendar call until May 9,
2019, so that he would have a chance to resolve a subpoena issue with his investigator. The State
expressed confusion, as Posin had not noticed any witnesses, to which Posin responded that the
initial investigator—who was employed by Investigator Robert Lawson (“Lawson”)—had
unexpectedly quit and left the defense in a logistical bind. The State opposed the continuance on
the grounds that the State was ready to proceed and had already noticed their witnesses on four
separate occasions. The district court denied the continuance, reasoning that Brass’ case had been
pending for over a year and had already received several continuances at Brass’ request.
On the first day of trial, Brass renewed his motion for a continuance, asserting that the State
had recently provided new discovery that warranted further investigation. The State contended that
the new discovery did not prejudice Brass because the information contained in the discovery had
been available to Posin since the preliminary hearing two years prior. At this point, Brass expressed
to the district court that he had not spoken with Posin since December 2018, did not believe Posin
was prepared to represent him, and had not discussed the case with Posin in any detail. On the
representation issue, the State argued that Posin was Brass’ retained counsel and had been on this
case since the first hearing, and that Brass had not offered specific examples that warranted another
continuance. The district court continued the hearing so that Lawson could address the court, and
in doing so Lawson expressed concerns regarding Posin’s lack of communication. The State
objected to another continuance, this time specifically citing trauma to the minor-aged victims, but
the court ultimately continued the trial a fourth time and set the new trial date for February 24,
2020.
At the August and October 2019 status checks, the State alerted the court that Posin had
not provided any information related to the investigation that formed the basis for the fourth
continuance. Moreover, Lawson stated that while he had spoken with Posin about the
investigation, he had yet to meet with Brass. Posin, on his part, opined that he was ready for trial.
During the two December 2019 status checks, the State again expressed concerns that Posin had
produced no discoverable material, despite the fact that Brass stated he wanted an investigation
into his phone. Posin maintained that he had “made inquiries” into various phone experts but had
not yet retained one at the time of the status check. Posin also established that he had met with
Lawson and Brass to review transcripts for the February 2020 trial. At the January 2020 status
check, Posin reiterated that he would be ready for trial.

At a February 20, 2020, calendar call, Posin explained to the court that Brass had alerted
him that morning that Brass had mailed a motion to have the court appoint substitute counsel. The
district court had not received the mailed motion but nonetheless conducted a sealed hearing
pursuant to Young v. State outside the State’s presence. 2 In this hearing, Brass maintained that
Posin had done nothing to prepare for trial, and that Lawson had privately informed Brass the week
prior that he had been unable to contact Posin to discuss the case or issue subpoenas. Brass was
unable to proffer any suggested witnesses beyond his brother, but Brass claimed that Lawson
informed him that there were additional individuals who needed to be subpoenaed that Posin had
failed to contact. Though Brass stated he met with Posin a month prior to trial, he contended that
the meeting lasted only five minutes, and the two did not discuss the case in detail.
For his part, Posin countered that he had extensively reviewed documents and met with
investigators in preparation for trial. Posin also maintained he did not believe the witnesses Brass
wanted to testify should be called, as he planned to cross-examine only the State’s witnesses. After
calling the State back to the hearing, the State objected to the continuance on the grounds that the
continued delays were stressful to the victims, and that the motion was untimely. The State
additionally argued that Brass failed to demonstrate why the court should appoint new counsel on
the first day of trial, after having retained and utilized Posin’s services for over two years. The
district court denied Brass’ motion to substitute appointed counsel, concluding that the motion was
untimely and that another continuance would be highly prejudicial to the State.
On the first day of trial, the district court held a second Young hearing to consider Brass’
renewed oral motion to substitute counsel. Posin conceded at this hearing that his initial strategy
to rely solely on cross-examining the State’s witnesses was likely inadequate. Lawson likewise
voiced concerns to the court regarding Posin’s failure to follow-up on investigative leads,
particularly as Lawson had apparently informed Posin of myriad exculpatory developments that
suggested Bass had not committed the crimes. Additionally, Lawson disclosed that Posin had yet
to speak with Brass about Brass potentially testifying, and that Brass had disclosed to Lawson his
dissatisfaction with Posin on several occasions. Ultimately, regarding Posin’s representation,
Lawson concluded by stating he could not let the court “believe for one minute that [Brass] [was]
getting any kind of a defense, let alone a bad defense.”
In response to Lawson’s statements, Posin countered that he had reviewed the State’s
evidence, prepared opening statements and cross-examinations, and discussed his defense strategy
with Lawson. However, Posin acknowledged that his preparation was insufficient, and that he had
recently become “more and more convinced” that his initial strategy to rely solely on crossexamining the State’s witnesses was inadequate. Tellingly, when the district court asked Posin if
it should refer Posin to the State Bar for potential discipline, Posin reneged on his former
concession and affirmed he would still be able to provide competent representation at trial.
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Once admitted into the hearing, the State again opposed Brass’ motion, highlighting that
at no point during the multiple status checks since the fourth continuance had Brass or Lawson
raised any diligence or competency issues with respect to Posin’s representation. The court agreed
with the State and denied Brass’ motion for being untimely and unduly prejudicial to the State and
its witnesses. The court also concluded that the issue between Brass and Posin was strategic in
nature and did not warrant substituting appointed counsel. At trial, the jury convicted Brass of 20
of the 22 counts, and the court sentenced Brass to an aggregate term of 115 years to life. Brass
appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Brass argued that the district court’s denial of his motion to substitute counsel
violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and that the motion was timely. In reviewing the district
court’s decision for abuse of discretion—i.e., analyzing whether the district court failed to give
due consideration to the issues at hand—the Supreme Court of Nevada agreed with Brass and
remanded his case for a new trial. 3
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel protects two distinct rights: (1) the right to effective
assistance of counsel and (2) the right of non-indigent defendants to be represented by the counsel
of their choosing.4 While related, the two rights implicate different tests. Specifically, when
defendants seek to substitute court-appointed counsel with different court-appointed counsel, the
Young test applies, and courts must analyze: (1) the extent of the conflict with counsel, (2) the
adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the conflict, and (3) the motion’s timeliness. 5 In
contrast, when defendants wish to substitute retained counsel for either court-appointed counsel or
different retained counsel, the Patterson test applies, which requires courts to ask whether (1)
granting the motion would significantly prejudice the defendant, or (2) the motion is untimely and
would result in an unreasonable disruption of the orderly processes of justice. 6 The Young test
requires a defendant to show inadequate representation or an irreconcilable conflict with counsel
in order for the court to grant their motion, while the Patterson test merely requires the court to
balance the defendant’s right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and the court’s
calendar.7 Properly applied, the Patterson test requires no inquiry into the defendant’s reasons for
wishing to discharge their retained attorney. 8

3

See Patterson v. State, 129 Nev. 168, 298 P.3d 433, 438–39 (2013).
Id. at 175, 298 P.3d at 438 (citing United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010)).
5
Young, 120 Nev. at 968, 102 P.3d at 576 (quoting United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir.
1998)).
6
Patterson, 129 Nev. at 176, 298 P.3d at 438 (quoting People v. Lara, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 201, 211–12 (Ct. App.
2001)).
7
Id. at 175, 298 P.3d at 438 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006)).
8
See People v. Ortiz, 800 P.2d 547, 553 (Cal. 1990).
4

Brass’ motion sought to substitute privately retained counsel with court-appointed counsel,
so the district court’s focus should have been on the right to counsel of one’s choice, as opposed
to the right to effective assistance of counsel. Although the district court erroneously relied on the
Young, rather than Patterson, factors in denying Brass’ motion, the Court was still able to analyze
the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion under the appropriate Patterson test because
the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law addressed the relevant Patterson factors.9
Neither party argued that granting Brass’ motion would cause him significant prejudice, so the
Court analyzed only the motion’s timeliness and whether the motion’s disruptive effects were
outweighed by Brass’ right to counsel of choice.
Whether a motion is timely depends upon the facts of that particular case. 10 Though Brass
first moved to substitute retained counsel a mere four days before the trial was set to begin, he
mailed the motion almost immediately after Lawson informed him that Posin was not prepared for
trial. Additionally, at each prior status check, Posin assured the court that he was diligently
preparing for trial, and Brass was entitled to rely on Posin’s in-court representations. 11 Brass thus
raised concerns regarding Posin’s preparation at the first opportunity after discovering those
circumstances, which supports his motion’s timeliness.
Additionally, though demonstrating inadequate representation or the existence of an
irreconcilable conflict is not determinative in retained counsel substitution cases, courts may
consider these factors in a timeliness analysis.12 At the hearing on Brass’ renewed motion, Posin
conceded that his initial trial strategy and preparation was insufficient, particularly in light of
Lawson’s potentially exculpatory leads, and Lawson—an experienced, court-appointed
investigator—disclosed that it seemed Posin had “literally no knowledge of [the] case.” With
Posin’s severely inadequate preparation in mind, the Court opined that Brass’ motion was timely,
concluding that this case was not one in which Brass arbitrarily and inappropriately attempted to
discharge his retained counsel on the first day of trial.13
The Court recognized that granting Brass’ motion would have disrupted the orderly
processes of justice, particularly for the State’s witnesses and young victims, but concluded that
the disruption was not unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. “Few derelictions by
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counsel are more significant than inadequate preparation for trial,” and Brass faced going to trial
with admittedly unprepared counsel in a twenty-two count felony case.14
Accordingly, while the district court was properly concerned about the prejudice associated
with granting Brass’ motion, the court abused its discretion in denying the motion under the
particular circumstances of Brass’ case. Brass’ motion was timely, and any disruption to the
orderly processes of justice was reasonable. The district court’s error was structural, so the Court
reversed Brass’ judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 15 The Court also
referred Posin to the State Bar of Nevada for disciplinary investigations pursuant to SCR 104(1)(a).
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right of non-indigent defendants to
retain the counsel of their choosing. When defendants seek to substitute retained counsel, courts
must evaluate whether the motion is timely and whether the defendant’s right to counsel of choice
outweighs the court’s interest in the efficient administration of justice.
Here, Brass’ motion was timely under the circumstances because Posin continuously represented
to Brass and the court that he was prepared for trial, Posin’s failure to subpoena records and
witnesses was not strategy-based, and Brass promptly moved the court to substitute counsel as
soon as he knew the full extent of Posin’s inadequate preparation. Brass’ right to counsel of choice
outweighs a further trial continuance’s potential prejudicial and disruptive effects. The record
reflects that Posin took no steps to investigate potentially exculpatory evidence, and Brass raised
these issues almost immediately after learning of them. The Court reversed the district court’s
judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial because the district court’s erroneous denial
of Brass’ motion to substitute counsel constituted structural error.
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